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I. Introduction  
 
In his introductory essay to this special issue, Greg Shaffer emphasizes two 
essential commitments which the new legal realists have inherited from the 
original legal realists of the early 20th century.1 The first is their commitment to 
empiricism, which in this context refers primarily to the use of social scientific 
methods to help us understand the law’s operation in the real world, as well as to 
guide the legal reform.2 The second is the legacy of Deweyan philosophical 
pragmatism, which Shaffer suggests is foundational to much scholarship in the 
mode of new legal realism. 
 
Taking this characterization of New Legal Realism as my starting point, I want to 
suggest that one of its central characteristics is the productive tension which lies 
at its core, between empiricist and pragmatist theories of knowledge. On one 
side, new realist work in its empiricist posture posits ‘a tangible, determinate 
world of facts or objective social functions whose operation [can] be seen at 
work upon, behind, or beneath the [law]’, and seeks to use empirical knowledge 
of this world as the basis on which to design, interpret, apply and criticize the 
law.3 In this posture, new realist work proceeds on the basis of a relatively 
traditional – though, as we shall see, never naïve – distinction between the 
subject and object of knowledge, and evinces a relatively robust belief in the 
ability of empirical methods to give us reliable access to the objective world 
(even if only ever progressively, provisionally, or partially). On the other side, 
the heavy influence of the pragmatist tradition pushes in another direction. The 
central figures of pragmatist thought famously stressed the intimate connections 
between knowledge and action: for pragmatists, the truth of a statement is not 
entirely independent of the context in which, and the purposes for which, it is 
used.4 In contrast to the empirical tradition, pragmatism seeks to problematise 
the distinctions between facts and value, subject and object, and thought and 
action. To the extent that it draws on the pragmatist tradition, then, new realist 
work tends to emphasise the social and political contingency of empirical 
knowledge claims, including its own.  
 
One of the most distinctive – and in many ways attractive – characteristics of 
scholarship in the new legal realist vein is its continued attempts to enact 
                                                        
1 Shaffer, ‘The New Legal Realist Approach to International Law’ [this issue, xx]; Shaffer, ‘New 
Legal Realism and International Law’ in Klug and Merry (eds), (forthcoming). 
2 Nourse and Shaffer, ‘Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a New 
Legal Theory’ (2009) 95 Cornell Law Review 61-137, 112. 
3 Trubek & Esser, ‘Critical Empiricism in American Legal Studies: Paradox, Program or Pandora’s 
Box?’ (1988) 14(1) Law & Social Inquiry 3-52, 9. 
4 See also Shaffer, ‘The New Legal Realist Approach to International Law’ [this issue, xx]. 
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creative syntheses of these different philosophies of truth, to be in Shaffer’s 
words, ‘a positivist, an interpretivist, and legal realist all at once’.5 Most of the 
strategies used to do this involve at their heart a reflexive move – by which I 
mean simply that they seek to use the process of empirical enquiry to recursively 
destabilise the positionality, frames of reference and conceptual tools of the 
researcher herself. Knowledge production in the reflexive mode, in other words, 
is understood to be a dynamic process of constituting both the subject and the 
object of knowledge, and introducing reflexivity is understood as the appropriate 
methodological response to the necessarily situated nature of all knowledge. But 
not all strategies adopt reflexivity as their core move, and the main aim of this 
paper is to draw attention to one which does not – one which we might want to 
call governing ‘as if’.6. Importantly, this strategy has arisen not so much in the 
context of scholarship (ie, the study of the law), but in the practical context of 
governance itself (ie, the operation of the law). 
 
The first part of this paper briefly introduces the issue, drawing on existing 
historical accounts of legal realism to trace the problematic and ambiguous place 
of scientism in the legal realist tradition. The legal realists were not as naïve in 
their championing of empiricism as sometimes appears, and the integration of 
law and social science which they inaugurated was more complicated and two-
sided than is often acknowledged. New Legal Realism’s ambivalence about the 
integration of law with social science, then, is less a departure from the old legal 
realist tradition than its most important inheritance. In the second and more 
important part of the paper, I argue that the ambivalence of the legal realists’ 
vision has left us, in certain contexts, with a complicated form of mixed legal-
scientific governance which has proved remarkably and surprisingly resilient in 
the face of late 20th century critiques of scientific objectivity. The illustrations I 
offer of this both come from the operation of the World Trade Organisation’s 
dispute settlement system, though the phenomenon I describe is more general. 
 
 
II. Empiricism and scientism 
 
A good place to start my argument is with Christopher Tomlins’ justly influential 
account of the encounter between law and the social sciences during the half 
century or so from the 1870s through to the heyday of legal realism in the 
1930s.7 In the story that he tells, Tomlins narrates legal realism’s turn to 
empirical social science as a response to two connected events, both of which 
had resonance far beyond the confines of legal scholarship. The first event was 
the decline of a prevailing 19th century conception of science and scholarly 
endeavour, which Tomlins (following Schweber) calls ‘Protestant Baconianism’. 
Protestant Baconianism entailed a number of core commitments. One was the 
belief that the truths of the world (and, indeed, of religion) ‘could be revealed 
                                                        
5 Shaffer, ‘The New Legal Realist Approach to International Law’ [this issue, xx]. 
6 See Lang, ‘Governing ‘as if’: Global subsidies regulation and the benchmark problem’ (2014) 
67(1) Current Legal Problems 135-168; Knop, Michaels and Riles, ‘From Multiculturalism to 
Technique: Feminism, Culture and the Conflict of Laws Style’ (2012) 64 Stanford Law Review 589.  
7 Tomlins, ‘Framing the Field of Law’s Disciplinary Encounters: A Historical Narrative’ (2000) 34 
Law and Society Review 911-972. 
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through the study of nature)’. Another was a commitment to inductive methods 
of reasoning, and a vision of science as taxonomy: ‘at the root of Protestant 
Baconianism lay the rejection of deductive reasoning, from given axioms to 
particular outcomes, in favor of the adoption of systematic discovery and 
classification.’ A third was a tendency to use and to valorize ‘systematic 
analogical reasoning’, with a view to ‘binding all forms of knowledge together in 
one grand synthesis’.8 Protestant Baconianism, in this telling, represented a very 
broad intellectual movement, one which affected the legal science of the 19th 
century just as much as any other field of intellectual endeavour. In the legal 
context, then, Protestant Baconianism entailed above all close observation of 
cases, in the belief that such close observation would reveal the underlying 
principles ‘that gave organization and structure to the law’. 9 It characteristically 
saw legal knowledge as ‘the product of a gradual, incremental process of 
discovering and perfecting natural laws embedded in human nature and 
reflected in the constitutional order’.10 This, of course, is something very close to 
what we now think of as old-style classical formalism.  
 
The second, related, event central to Tomlins’ story was the professionalization 
of scientific enquiry towards the end of the 19th century, and the concomitant 
emergence of the social scientific disciplines as institutionally and conceptually 
distinct domains of knowledge. In contrast to the genteel amateurism of 
Protestant Baconianism, the new disciplines were ‘modes of specialized 
academic inquiry and professional self-identification’. Their core site of 
production the university, rather than merely ‘public discourse and 
commonsense beliefs of the competent’.11 This constituted a major threat to the 
authority of the law, not just in the academy, but in the practice of statecraft 
itself: 
 
[i]n public policy formation and state action, legal discourse – at the 
beginning of the 1870s "the most authoritative American policy language" 
– was increasingly challenged by the newer "social vocabularies" of the 
disciplines.  
 
Legislators, he notes, were advised to study society itself, rather than the 
traditional learning associated with the law, as the most useful guide to the 
political choices they had to make.12 
 
It was in the midst of these two epochal events that key figures in the legal realist 
movement – and indeed a number of their precursors in the late 19th century – 
famously articulated a strong case for the integration of law with the social 
sciences.13 Realists such as Llewellyn, Underhill Moore, Brandeis, Douglas and 
others championed the use of social science to inform jurisprudence, and 
                                                        
8 Tomlins, ‘Framing the Field’, 914. 
9 Tomlins, ‘Framing the Field’, 917. 
10 Tomlins, ‘Framing the Field’, 925, references omitted. 
11 Tomlins, ‘Framing the Field’, 922. 
12 Tomlins, ‘Framing the Field’, 925. 
13 See generally Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science (Chapel Hill: Univ. 
of North Carolina Press, 1995). 
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scholarly thinking about the law more generally. Furthermore, and importantly, 
the project to integrate the law and social sciences occurred within the state just 
as much as it did the academy. Legal realism represented not just a new 
approach to the study of law, but also an alternative vision of how law should 
operate in practice, and how governance should work. Tomlins refers to the 
work of Lester Frank Ward as an illustration of what this meant: 
 
Ward sought [the] establishment of "a new system of governance" 
expressed in new laws and regulatory conventions premised "on the 
existence of reliable ways of publicly monitoring the actual effects of 
incentives in achieving social purposes" … Law should hence become the 
product of legislatures re-imagined as sites for the inculcation and 
application of the new social knowledges … the product of legislative 
mechanics informed by expert study of society[.]14 
 
This vision of governance was of course to prove massively influence over the 
course of the 20th century, giving rise to a huge variety of new forms of 
administrative and judicial practice.  
 
Crucially, in the story which Tomlins tells, this attempt to integrate the law with 
social scientific disciplines worked in two directions at the same time. On one 
side, the turn to social science helped the legal realists to re-ground the authority 
of the law, just as the authority provided by classical formalism was being 
radically eroded. Thus, to borrow now from Trubek and Esser’s account, where 
the realists’ critique of formalism ‘posed a disintegrating threat to mainstream 
legal culture … empiricism offered a possible mode of reintegration.’15 Having 
lost faith in the ability of tradition and doctrine to rationally guide the 
development of the law, and armed with a vision of law as an instrument of 
social engineering, the legal realists argued that the law ought to be guided by 
reliable knowledge of its consequences on the social world – the sort of 
knowledge that the new social sciences promised to provide. Empirical social 
science, on this view, offered access to the determinate reality of the real world 
behind the law, on the basis of which a more secure and authoritative legal 
science could be established. The legal realists sought, in McEvoy’s words, ‘to 
bring facts to bear on the management of social life’, and the expert judgment of 
the new social sciences was to act as the source of those facts.16 In this sense, 
through the integration of law and social sciences, the law cloaked itself in the 
apparent objectivity and authority of the social sciences themselves. 
 
But, on the other side, Tomlins also suggests that the call to integrate law with 
social science also served to resist the threat which the social sciences 
themselves posed to the authority of law as the primary discourse of politics and 
public power. The history of the actual interactions between lawyers and social 
                                                        
14 Tomlins, ‘Framing the Field’, 925-6, footnote omitted. 
15 Trubek & Esser, ‘Critical Empiricism in American Legal Studies: Paradox, Program or Pandora’s 
Box?’ (2011) 12(1) German Law Journal 115-158, 120. See also Macauley, "The New Versus the 
Old Legal Realism: 'Things Ain't What They Used To Be'" [2005] 2 Wisconsin Law Review 365-403, 
367. 
16 McEvoy, ‘A New Realism for Legal Studies’ [2005] 2 Wisconsin Law Review 433-454, 443. 
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scientists in the context of the construction of the New Deal regulatory state, he 
argues, shows the resilience of law in the face of the policy sciences. Lawyers 
were good at talking about the use of social scientific knowledge, he suggests, but 
when push came to shove were just as likely to reassert the primacy and higher 
relevance of their own distinctive legal expertise, while appropriating just 
enough of the social science to shore up their own authority. As a result, he notes, 
the actual encounters between lawyers and social scientists in the practical 
operation of governance were by no means always harmonious, and very often it 
was the lawyers who prevailed. The overall effect, in his view, was to re-assert 
law’s capacity to police the entry of new forms of social knowledge into the 
state.17 
 
The key point that I want to take from Tomlins account, then, is that the legal 
realist’s turn to social science was in some important respects an ambivalent and 
ambiguous move from the very beginning. Certainly, it represented a moderately 
deferential attempt to borrow the objectivity and authority of the social sciences 
for the purposes of law – an attempt to ‘bring the facts to bear’ on the study of 
law, in order to displace and discipline the perceived amateurism and 
disciplinary conservatism of classical formalism. But it also represented a way of 
countering the threat that the disciplines posed to law, a way of re-asserting the 
authority of the law as against that of the social sciences, and thus maintaining 
the place of law and legal expertise at the heart of political and public life. The 
project to bring together the legal and the social scientific imagination was, in 
other words, just as much an exercise in boundary-marking as an exercise in 
inter-disciplinary integration.  
 
I will return to some of these points later on, but for the moment let me jump 
forward in time, past the demise of legal realism, to the re-emergence of 
empirical legal scholarship some decades after the end of World War 2, primarily 
in the context of the law and society movement. As Shaffer notes in his 
introductory essay, while the return to empiricism at this time reflected the 
continuing legacy of legal realism, it also differed from its legal realists 
predecessors in a number of important respects.18 One of the most important 
differences was that, now, towards the end of the 20th century, it was 
accompanied by a deeper awareness of the limits of empirical methods, and a 
more profound skepticism of some of the stronger claims made about the ability 
of both natural and social scientific disciplines to produce objective truths about 
the world. This was the result of a number of developments, from the Kuhnian 
revolution in the philosophy of science, to the erosion of public faith in since as a 
rule of its high profile failures to predict or manage catastrophic risks. But 
whatever its source, this new skepticism brought with it a number of searching 
critiques of attempts to integrate law and the social sciences. And, importantly, 
these critiques in many respects closely mirrored the criticisms which the legal 
realists themselves had made of classical formalism more than half a century 
earlier. 
 
                                                        
17 Tomlins, ‘Framing the Field’, eg 936, 944, 963. 
18 Shaffer, ‘The New Legal Realist Approach to International Law’, [xx]. 
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Trubek and Esser’s 1989 essay on ‘Critical Empiricism’ is the best illustration for 
my purposes (though there are many others19), and one which is worth recalling 
in some detail.20 In this paper, the two authors began by looking back at the 
previous two decades of law and society scholarship. The founders of the law 
and society movement, they argued, tacitly accepted three fundamental 
epistemological and political commitments, which they inherited from the legal 
realists: ‘determinism’, ‘universal scientism’ and ‘untroubled reformism’. 
Determinism, in their account, is the belief that ‘social action is governed by laws, 
much like the laws which govern the rotation of the planets’.21 This belief leads 
to a form of scholarship which seeks to ‘develop models of the laws of social 
action which pertain to legal phenomena’.22 Universal scientism, they go on, is a 
theory of knowledge which ‘presupposes a radical distinction between an 
external world of objects … and an internal world of consciousness’. It is the 
external world of objects, in this theory, which is the ‘ultimate arbiter[]’ of the 
truth claims we makes about it, and ‘methods of empirical inquiry allow us to 
determine if the scientific knowledge we hypothesize adequately describes the 
external world we can apprehend’.23 Untroubled reformism, finally, ‘presumes 
that the products, procedures, and projects of social science should be used as 
instruments in the service of the legal system’.24 
 
One strand of law and society scholarship, they argued, had begun to usefully 
destabilize two of these three political-epistemological commitments: 
determinism and untroubled reformism. At the core of this new strand, they 
argue, is a critique of, and departure from, an ‘instrumental’ theory of law and 
social action. This instrumental theory (which, it should be noted, remains to this 
day influential across all forms of legal scholarship) is, in their account, made up 
of a set of apparently commonsense claims about the nature of social action, and 
the ways in which law affects behaviour. The first claims is that that a clear 
distinction must be drawn between the subjectivity of actors (their values, 
knowledge and evaluative criteria) and the objective world in which they act. 
Our beliefs about the world, and the world itself, are, to speak simply, perfectly 
distinct domains. The second claim is that individual social action, in its idealized 
form, involves the choice of a value, and the selection of a behaviour which is 
most likely to fulfil that value, based on subjective knowledge of the likely 
consequences of that behaviour. The third is that the law and legal institutions 
are in essence instruments: that is to say, means to achieve certain publicly 
defined ends. And the fourth is that the legal system furthers these ends by 
imposing constraints on individual behaviour, seeking to channel individual 
conduct according to prescribed rules which, if followed, will tend to achieve the 
law’s underlying purposes. 
 
                                                        
19 See, eg, Sarat and Silbey, ‘The Pull of the Policy Audience’ (1988) Law and Policy 97-166. 
20 Se generally, Trubek and Esser, Law and Social Inquiry. See also Trubek and Esser, German Law 
Journal. 
21 Trubek and Esser, Law and Social Inquiry, 11.  
22 Trubek and Esser, German Law Journal, 122. 
23 Trubek and Esser, Law and Social Inquiry, 11. 
24 Trubek and Esser, Law and Social Inquiry, 11. 
 7 
Against this instrumental theory, the new strand of scholarship posited an 
interpretive theory of action. One key element of the interpretive theory is that, 
instead of taking the individual with her value choices as given for the purposes 
of analysis, it enquires into the social origins of actors’ subjectivities. In Trubek 
and Esser’s words: 
 
For an interpretivist, the values, knowledge, and evaluative criteria 
embodied in the subjectivity of the actor are not individually held units of 
meaning but rather are the threads or traces of a collectively held fabric 
of social relations. Further, in the interpretivist perspective the individual 
does not appropriate this fabric through the conscious selection of values 
or learning of existing knowledge. Rather, in some sense this fabric 
"appropriates" the individual so that without self‐conscious reflection the 
actor comes to desire the ends, utilize the perspectives, and apply the 
rationality which constitute the social fabric.25 
 
From this perspective, then, it is never just a question of whether the law is 
rationally designed to fulfil given individual and social purposes – it is also 
necessary to enquire whether and how those purposes are themselves the 
product of an engagement with the law (or more generally with a legally 
constituted social environment).  
 
A second distinguishing element of interpretive theories of action, according to 
Trubek and Esser is that they reject the instrumentalists’ clear separation of 
actors’ subjectivities and their actions: 
 
The interpretive theory rejects the ideas/behavior distinction and 
conceives action as a synthesis of behavior and social meaning. It sees 
social action as practices that combine interests in the world and 
perceptions of the world to create implicit schemes of response, 
dispositions, or habit.26 
 
Trubek and Esser go on to note how the adoption of an interpretive theory of 
action had led some to criticize and reject both the determinism, and the 
untroubled reformism, of prior law and society scholarship, and to attempt to 
craft a new, critical law and sociology on that foundation. But – and this is the 
core point of their paper – they go on to argue that this new strand still adheres 
to a rather uncritical scientism. Even this new strand of scholarship, they argued, 
seems ‘to retain and share a belief that social science can provide authoritative 
descriptions of the world’. This is unusual, they rightly suggest, precisely because 
unqualified scientism is inconsistent with elements of interpretive theories of 
action.27 
 
As Erlanger and his co-authors have observed, the critique of scientism – and 
more generally the assertion that all scientific knowledge was in some important 
sense a product of its social, political and historical context – resulted in 
                                                        
25 Trubek and Esser, Law and Social Inquiry, 17. 
26 Trubek and Esser, Law and Social Inquiry, 17-18. 
27 Trubek and Esser, Law and Social Inquiry, 35. 
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something of a split in law and society scholarship between what they term 
‘standpoint scholarship and more positivist approaches’.28 It is not my intention 
in this paper to trace the nature or consequences of this split. But I do want to 
note, however, how it reflects, in some important ways, a latent ambivalence 
which was already present in legal realism, and which has become one of its 
most important legacies.29  
 
Many accounts of the legal realists – including of course Trubek and Esser’s – see 
legal realist scholarship as allied fundamentally to an instrumental theory of 
both law and action. Certainly it is true that, for many of the argument which 
realists sought to make, instrumentalist theories of action served their purposes 
well enough. Most obviously, the realists were keen to showcase law’s function 
as an instrument of economic coercion by the dominant classes. But it is also true 
that the streams of social thought on which legal realism drew most profoundly 
were decisively allied to non-instrumental theories of action. The alliance which 
the legal realists made with institutional economists, for example, certainly 
brought them in contact with non-instrumental theories of action. Indeed, one of 
the major criticisms which the institutionalists had of the neoclassical school of 
economists had to do with the latter’s adherence to what they saw as an 
unrealistic and overly simple rational-instrumental theory of action in the 
economic realm.30 Furthermore, legal realism’s philosophical allegiances were of 
course largely to philosophical pragmatism of the James/Deweyan stripe, and 
pragmatism’s theory of action is clearly interpretive in orientation. Pragmatism 
famously rejects, for example, the separation of means and ends so central to 
instrumentalism, noting how often we come to know our own interest, values 
and preferences by reference to, and through engagement with, the means made 
available to realize them.31  
 
It is equally common to criticize the legal realists for their naïve empiricism, and 
their adherence to an apparently fully objectivist theory of knowledge. Again, 
however, it is worth recalling that pragmatism adheres to a theory of knowledge 
which at heart seeks to dereify and denaturalize our categories of knowledge. 
Furthermore, in some aspects of their work, the realists demonstrated a 
profound awareness of the recursive relationship between the world and our 
knowledge of it. This is probably most apparent in their work on markets. It is, 
after all, the realists who first showed us that law constitutes markets just as 
much as it regulates them – that law was in fact productive of the economic 
order, even before it acted on economic life in the form of a constraint.32 This had 
immediate implications for the realists’ call to integrate empirical economic 
                                                        
28 Erlanger et al., ‘Is it time for a New Legal Realism?’ [2005] 2 Wisconsin Law Review 335-363, 
343. 
29 See also Nourse and Shaffer, ‘Varieties of New Legal Realism’, 95. 
30 For perhaps the most famous example, see Veblen, ‘Why is Economics not an Evolutionary 
Science’ (1898) 12 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 373-397. 
31 Shaffer makes the same point in his framing paper in this issue, see [xx].  
32 See Robert L. Hale, “Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State,” Political 
Science Quarterly 38, no. 3 (1923): 470–494; Robert L. Hale, “Bargaining, Duress, and Economic 
Liberty,” Columbia Law Review 43, no. 5 (1943): 603–628; Robert L. Hale, “Force and the State: A 
Comparison of ‘Political’ and ‘Economic’ Compulsion,” Columbia Law Review 35, no. 2 (1935): 
149–201. 
 9 
analysis into the life of the law. On one hand, as we have seen above, they sought 
to bring the ‘facts’ of economic life to bear on the law, in the context of their 
rejection of the methods of classical formalism. On the other, by denaturalizing 
markets, and showing their legally constituted nature, they also implicitly 
demonstrated the extent to which the ‘facts’ of economic life were themselves in 
significant part the product of legal rules and legal choices. In that sense, the 
realists sought to bring law to bear on facts, just as much as bringing facts to bear 
on law.33 Indeed, in my view it is the realists who provided much of the 
foundation of contemporary thinking about the recursive relationship between 
markets and our knowledge of them.34  
 
A latent tension existed, then, in legal realist scholarship between empiricist and 
pragmatist theories of action and of knowledge. From empiricism, the realists 
borrowed their commitment to objectivity, their belief in a foundational truth of 
the world which lay beneath and behind law’s ideological function. From 
pragmatism, they took the insight that all knowledge is in some sense bound up 
in action, is always adopted for a purpose, and in that sense is context-contingent 
in fundamental ways. It is the tension between these two positions which the 
‘new’ legal realism has fundamentally inherited from the ‘old’, rather than an 
apparently one-sided emphasis on empiricism.  
 
I do not mean to press this point too far. Shaffer has persuasively argued that a 
key point of difference between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ legal realism is precisely that 
the latter takes much more explicitly into account ‘critical, epistemological 
challenges to factual and legal constructions … [and are] more scrutinizing of 
objective presentations of ‘law’ and ‘fact’.’35 ‘What is particularly “new” in new 
legal realism’, he suggests, ‘is … that it engages in critical self-reflection of its 
empirical endeavors’. McEvoy, too, sees the distinctive character of New Legal 
Realism in its close attentiveness to the recursive qualities of the social world.36 
If the tension in the old legal realism largely remained latent, in new legal realist 
scholarship it has become both cliché and truism in the field to note that all 
knowledge is situated, that all truths are produced from a particular standpoint, 
and that the categories we use to apprehend the world are not natural but in part 
politically and socially constructed.37 Indeed, it is one of the most significant and 
interesting aspects of new legal realist work that it continues to throw up new 
and creative ways of reconciling this tension.  
 
                                                        
33 That is to say, they did not just ask how the law might be more responsive to existing dynamics 
of markets, but in addition also sought to show the role that law played in producing such 
dynamics. 
34 See, eg, Callon, “Introduction: The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics,” in The 
Laws of Markets, ed. Michel Callon (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 1–57; Mackenzie, Do Economists 
Make Markets? On the performativity of economics (Princeton NJ, Princeton UP, 2008); MacKenzie, 
Material Markets: How Economic Agents Are Constructed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); 
Donald Mackenzie, An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2006); Lang, 'The legal construction of economic rationalities' (2013) 40(1)  
Journal of Law & Society 155-171. 
35 Shaffer, ‘The New Legal Realist Approach to International Law’, [xx]. 
36 McEvoy, ‘A New Realism for Legal Studies’, generally. 
37 Erlanger et al., ‘Is it time for a New Legal Realism?’, 342-43. 
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By what techniques has it done so? How, in other words, has empirical legal 
scholarship in the new realist tradition responded to the increased awareness of 
the political and social foundations of scientific knowledge? For many, the 
central response has been to incorporate an element of reflexivity into their 
scholarly practice. As a first step, this involves developing a heightened 
awareness of one’s own positionality, and of the extent to which one’s research is 
a product of its social context. More significantly, it involves using the process of 
research actively to foreground, destabilize and reconstruct the frame of 
reference with which one begins. Shaffer and Nourse’s ‘emergent analytics’ is 
one illustration. ‘Emergent’ research, for these authors, is ‘research that uses 
categories that develop out of qualitative empirical engagement’,38 or, in an 
alternative formulation, research which is able to ‘uncover biases within 
[itself]’.39 Sarat and Silbey’s famous call for a critical empirical practice is another 
illustration, in which they argue that the purpose of empirical procedures is to 
provide a ‘method through which the constitutive assumptions of the dominant 
paradigm can be identified and changed to construct a new perspective’.40 
 
But it is not just legal scholarship which has had to adjust to post-structuralist 
theories of knowledge. Institutions and regimes of practical governance have 
also had to respond, since at least the 1970s, to the erosion of public confidence 
in the truth claims of science. A large part of new legal realist work, then, has 
been directed also towards instilling reflexivity in the practice of governance 
itself – reflexivity, that is to say, between the institutions of the law, and the 
social world on which they operate. In this context, reflexivity includes the 
recursive process of monitoring the effects of the law, and continually calling 
into question the law itself in light of these observations – not just to increase its 
effectiveness, but much more importantly to constantly rethink the law’s 
underlying objectives, values, techniques and institutional architecture. The 
literature on ‘new governance’ approaches is probably the best and most 
developed illustration of this, though the notions of ‘complex learning’ and 
‘adaptive governance’ represent roughly cognate developments.41All this is well 
understood.  
 
In this paper, my focus is on the practice of governance rather than on legal 
scholarship. But I want to shift the focus away from practices of reflexivity, and 
instead argue that there is a different strategyfor responding to critiques of 
scientific objectivity which has emerged primarily in practical contexts of 
governance, and which is quite important, even if it is so mundane as to be rarely 
remarked upon. And I want to suggest, perhaps surprisingly, that it reflects not 
much more than a continuation in practice of the form of governance imagined 
and to some extent realized by the legal realists of early the twentieth century. 
                                                        
38 Nourse and Shaffer, ‘Varieties of New Legal Realism’, 119, also nn230, 231. 
39 Shaffer, ‘The New Legal Realist Approach to International Law’, [xx]. 
40 Trubek and Esser, Law and Social Inquiry, 43, referring to Sarat and Silbey, ‘The Pull of the 
Policy Audience’. 
39 Sabel & Simon, ‘Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds’ (2004) 117 
Harvard Law Review 1016, Haas and Haas, 'Learning to Learn: Improving International 
Governance', (1995) 1 Global Governance 255; Cooney and Lang, 'Taking uncertainty seriously: 
adaptive governance, alien invasive species and the WTO' (2007) 18(3) European Journal of 
International Law 523-551. 
 11 
Recall where I began, with Tomlins’ insight that the legal realists’ turn to social 
science represented an ambivalent double movement. It allowed the law to cloak 
itself in the objectivity of social science, even as it kept crucially intact law’s 
formal autonomy, the better to re-assert its authority over precisely the social 
sciences on which it lent. It turns out that the mode of mixed legal-scientific 
techno-governance which this ambivalent turn produced provided a number of 
practical tools for dealing pragmatically with the challenges to scientific 
authority thrown up in the second half of the 20th century – without the need to 
turn to reflexivity. In a world in which both legal formalism and scientific 
empiricism had been fundamentally undermined as sources of objectivity, this 
mode of governance has been able to continue to satisfy the practical demand for 
objective decision-making in particular sites of governance, with only a relatively 
minor and sometimes barely perceptible shift in the meaning of objectivity. This 
is best explained by example, and in the next two sections I offer two 




III. Economic expertise in the application of the Subsidies Agreement  
 
The first illustration comes from the jurisprudence under the World Trade 
Organisation’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM 
Agreement). The SCM agreement is a relatively recent one, having come into 
effect in 1995 after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. It 
is a somewhat complicated agreement, but my purpose here is simply to show 
how the jurisprudence under this agreement displays precisely the sort of the 
ambivalent integration of law and social sciences which the legal realists have 
bequeathed to us, sometimes drawing heavily on economic expertise to interpret 
key legal terms, sometimes doing precisely the opposite.  
 
One illustration of the former can be found in the definition of the term ‘subsidy’ 
itself. UUnder Article 1.1 of the SCM agreement, a subsidy is deemed to exist, 
where (a) there is either a ‘financial contribution’ by a government or public 
body, or any form of ‘income or price support’; and (b) a ‘benefit is thereby 
conferred’ on the recipient. A central question in the application of the 
agreement, then, is whether a ‘benefit’ exists, because it is only once a ‘benefit’ is 
found do the substantive obligations of the agreement have application. And it is 
in the interpretation of the term ‘benefit’, I want to argue, that we see precisely 
the sort of the ambivalent integration of law and social sciences which the legal 
realists have bequeathed to us.  
 
In many of the cases on this point, panels and the Appellate Body have used 
techniques and concepts drawn from economics to help them to interpret the 
meaning of ‘benefit’. To start with, the Appellate Body has made clear that the 
market is the yardstick by which a ‘benefit’ is to be identified and measured.42 As 
a result, the Appellate Body has found itself on some occasions required to define 
                                                        
42 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft (adopted 20 
Aug 1999), WT/DS70/AB/R (‘Canada – Aircraft (AB)’), para 157. 
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the relevant market for the purposes of a benefit analysis. Since certain strands 
of economics offer a well developed set of tools, concepts and techniques for the 
purpose of market definition, it is no surprise that we see the Appellate Body 
turn to economic expertise in its jurisprudence on this question. For instance, in 
the 2013 decision in Canada – Feed-in-Tariffs, the Appellate Body used the 
concepts of demand-side substitutability and supply-side substitutability to help 
it decide that the wholesale market for renewable energy in Ontario was distinct 
from that of wholesale electricity more generally.43 Certain parts of its judgment 
are, in their form, very similar to standard economic analyses of market 
competition: 
 
… supply-side factors suggest that windpower and solar PV producers of 
electricity cannot compete with other electricity producers because of 
differences in cost structures and operating costs and characteristics. 
Windpower and solar PV technologies have very high capital costs (as compared 
to other generation technologies), very low operating costs, and fewer, if any, 
economies of scale. Windpower and solar PV technologies produce electricity 
intermittently (depending on the availability of wind and sun) and cannot be 
relied on for base- load and peak-load electricity. Differences in cost structures 
and operating costs and characteristics between windpower and solar PV 
technologies, on the one hand, and other technologies, on the other hand, make 
it very unlikely, if not impossible, that the former may exercise any form of price 
constraint on the latter. In contrast, conventional generators produce an 
identical commodity that can be used for base-load and peak-load electricity. 
They have larger economies of scale and exercise price constraints on 
windpower and solar PV generators … 44 
 
In subsequent paragraphs, the Appellate Body also deployed the traditional 
economic notions of positive and negative externalities to support its argument 
that electricity from different sources ought to be treated differently.45  
 
Another illustration can be taken from 2008 Appellate Body decision in US – 
Cotton (21.5), in which Brazil challenged a variety of different measures taken by 
the US government to support the domestic production and export of cotton. 
Here the relevant question was not the existence of a ‘benefit’, but rather 
whether the subsidies given to US cotton farmers caused ‘significant price 
suppression’ in markets for cotton, as required under Article 6.3(c) of the SCM 
Agreement. In considering this question, the Appellate Body made it clear that 
techniques borrowed from economics would, unsurprisingly, in some cases be 
helpful in determining causation: 
 
Given the focus on production and price effects, an analysis of price suppression 
would normally include a quantitative component. There is some inherent 
difficulty in quantifying the effects of subsidies, because, as we have indicated, 
the increase in prices, absent the subsidies, cannot be directly observed. One 
way to undertake the analysis is to use economic modelling or other quantitative 
                                                        
43 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Sector; 
Canada—Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff (FIT) Program, (adopted 24 May 2013), 
WT/DS412, 426/AB/R, (‘Canada – FIT (AB)’). 
44 Canada – FIT (AB) para 5.174. 
45 Canada – FIT (AB) para 5.189. 
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techniques …[which] provide a framework to analyze the relationship between 
subsidies, other factors, and price movements.46  
 
The role of the Panel, the Appellate Body has noted, is to assess the evidentiary 
value of the models in question, and to the extent that they are considered 
convincing to a Panel, they are often in practice sufficient to dispose of the legal 
question of price suppression under Article 6.3(c).47 A similar attitude was 
adopted in US – Large Civil Aircraft in which the Appellate Body suggested that 
the counterfactual analysis necessitated by Article 6.3 ‘requires the adjudicator 
to undertake a modelling exercise as to what the market would look like in the 
absence of subsidies’.48 As a result of such comments, it is now not uncommon 
for parties to engage in considerable technical argument concerning the 
appropriate economic models to use, the validity of the assumptions on which 
they are based, their applicability and application to the case at hand, and so 
on.49  
 
The Appellate Body decision in EC – Aircraft, for example, is also noteworthy in 
this context for the way in which it interprets the legal concept of ‘export 
contingency’ by reference to certain distinctions drawn from the economic 
notion of a market distortion. The standard of ‘export contingency’ is not met, 
the Appellate Body suggests, ‘merely because the granting of the subsidy is 
designed to increase a recipient's production, even if the increased production is 
exported in whole’. It is also not met simply because ‘the granting of the subsidy 
may, in addition to increasing exports, also increase the recipient's domestic 
sales.’ Rather,  
 
we consider that the standard for de facto export contingency under Article 
3.1(a) and footnote 4 of the SCM Agreement would be met when the subsidy is 
granted so as to provide an incentive to the recipient to export in a way that is 
not simply reflective of the conditions of supply and demand in the domestic and 
export markets undistorted by the granting of the subsidy.50  
 
In order to prove its case, then, a complainant may provide evidence of historical 
sales, or if historical sales data are not available, ‘the comparison could be made 
with the performance that a profit-maximizing firm would hypothetically be 
expected to achieve in the export and domestic markets in the absence of the 
subsidy’.51 
 
It is true that, in all of these examples, the Appellate Body applied certain 
economic concepts in ways that some economists might object to. All of the 
                                                        
46 US – Subsidies on Upland Cotton Recourse to Article 21.5 by Brazil (adopted 20 Jun 2008), 
WT/DS267/AB/RW, (‘US-Cotton (21.5)), para 356 (citations omitted). 
47 US – Cotton (21.5), Appellate Body Report, para 357. 
48 EC – Large Civil Aircraft, para 1110. 
49 The EU advanced a calibrated model in the Panel proceedings in that case: Appendix VII.F.2, 
para 61; see also Dominic Coppens, WTO Disciplines on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: 
Balancing Policy Space and Legal Constraints (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
50 EC – Large Civil Aircraft, para 1045.  
51 EC – Large Civil Aircraft, para 1047. 
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decisions referred to above have been criticised on that basis.52 But the point I 
wish to make is simply that, in these illustrations, the Appellate Body is 
interpreting the law so that, to speak loosely, it becomes something of a vehicle 
for economic forms of expertise and analysis. Economic concepts are used to give 
meaning and colour to legal concepts. And the application of a legal provision is 
in practical terms largely governed by the determination of certain facts through 
economic analysis – whether it be product scope of the market, the causal impact 
of the measure in question, the magnitude of price effects, or something else – 
and gives to the tools of economic expertise the primary role in the 
determination of such facts. This is not too far from the sort of jurisprudence 
informed by social science which the realists so often advocated.  
 
At the same time, however, there is also an apparently contradictory mode of 
argumentation in the jurisprudence, which pushes in exactly the opposite 
direction. This mode begins with the opposite claim that the incorporation of 
economic concepts into law transforms their nature. Precisely by virtue of being 
written into treaties, they become legal concepts, the defining feature of which is 
precisely their (potential) divergence from their economic counterparts. In this 
mode, the questions of market definition and causation are not primarily factual 
matters, but legal questions, for which economic expertise may be helpful, but 
very far from determinative. When arguing in this mode, judges and interpreters 
foreground their departures from economic expertise and perceptions, and 
indeed see their function as in part to cut short, or circumvent, potentially 
endless debates between and among economic experts about the adequacy and 
accuracy of any particular analysis, by reference to an alternative set of self-
consciously legal techniques, including the deliberate production of legal fictions. 
 
Examples of this mode of reasoning can be found in precisely the same cases as 
those referred to above. I noted above, for example, that the Appellate Body had 
recourse to economic techniques to define the product scope of the relevant 
market in the Canada – FIT case. But in a subsequent step of the argument, the 
Appellate Body performed precisely the opposite move, reframing the argument 
so as to highlight the differences between the economic and legal concepts of ‘the 
market’. One of the claims made by the complainants in that case was that the 
prices paid to such suppliers of renewable energy under long-term contractual 
arrangements were higher than they would have received under market 
conditions, and thus constituted a subsidy. A benchmark market price was 
needed, therefore, to determine whether or not the price did indeed constitute a 
subsidy. But here a difficult question arose: should the benchmark price be 
calculated taking the government-mandated energy-supply mix as given, or 
should it be calculated without such a constraint? If the government-mandated 
supply mix were ignored, there was clearly a subsidy – there was no argument 
that a market for renewables simply would not exist in the absence of such a 
government mandate. 
 
                                                        
52 See, e.g., Luca Rubini, ‘What Does the Recent WTO Litigation on Renewable Energy Subsidies 
Tell Us about Methodology in Legal Analysis? The Good, the Bad and the Ugly’ (2014) EUI 
Working Paper 2014/05. 
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The Appellate Body found that it had to take the supply mix as given. The 
reasons given had to do with the idiosyncracies of electricity markets, the 
Canadian experience with electricity liberalisation, and especially the sovereign 
right of WTO Members to organise their electricity markets: 
 
Although [a government defined supply mix] has an effect on market prices, as 
opposed to a situation where prices are determined by unconstrained forces of 
supply and demand, it does not exclude per se treating the resulting prices as 
market prices for the purposes of a benefit analysis under Article 1.1(b) of the 
SCM Agreement. Thus, where the government has defined an energy supply-mix 
that includes windpower and solar PV electricity generation technologies, as in 
the present disputes, a benchmark comparison for purposes of a benefit analysis 
for windpower and solar PV electricity generation should be with the terms and 
conditions that would be available under market-based conditions for each of 
these technologies, taking the supply-mix as a given.53 
 
It is true that much of the economic evidence tendered by the parties related to 
markets which did not contain such a government-defined supply mix, and 
which more closely approximated a textbook ‘free market’ in electricity. But, 
based in significant part on its understanding of the limitations of its mandate 
and institutional role, the Appellate Body did not see itself as having the freedom 
to adopt the textbook free market as its benchmark, nor even real-life markets 
which approximated it. Instead, then, the Appellate Body draws a clear line 
between legal notion of the ‘market’ in a benchmark analysis under the SCM 
Agreement, and that which is deployed in economic analysis. The Appellate Body 
emphasises that they are, in the final analysis, distinct and mutually irreducible 
concepts. 
 
Another example of a similar move comes from the Brazil-Aircraft case. One of 
the questions in that case was whether certain elements of Brazil’s export 
financing programme were protected by the wording of Item (k) of the 
Illustrative List of Export Subsidies, which defined certain measures as export 
subsidies, but only where they are ‘used to secure a material advantage in the 
field of export credit terms’. Brazil argued that the payments in question were 
not in fact used to secure an advantage, but instead merely to offset Canada’s 
subsidies to its own aircraft industry, as well as to reduce an artificial 
disadvantage which Brazilian companies faced given the ‘Brazil risk’ that the 
market priced into credit terms for such companies (in part on account of 
economic policies of the Brazilian government itself).54 This argument 
potentially raised complex problems of economic analysis. Was the relevant 
market distorted, by the practices in question? If so, how might a more accurate 
market price be constructed from existing economic evidence? But the panel 
avoided such problems easily, simply noting the absence of any express textual 
                                                        
53 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy General 
Sector (adopted 24 May 2013), WT/DS412/AB/R, para 5.190 (emphasis added). See also Panel 
Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy General Sector (adopted 24 
May 2013), WT/DS412/R, para 7.308-313 
54 Panel Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (‘Brazil-Aircraft (Panel)’), 
(adopted 20 Aug 1999), WT/DS46/R, paras 7.21-22.  
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support for Brazil’s position in the SCM Agreement, and thereby short-circuiting 
potentially complicated economic analysis: 
 
In no case is it suggested that whether or not a benefit exists would depend upon a 
comparison with advantages available to a competing product from another 
Member […] Nor can we find any suggestion in either Article 3.1(a) of the SCM 
Agreement or the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies that whether a measure is a 
prohibited export subsidy should depend upon whether the measure merely offsets 
advantages bestowed on competing products from another Member.55 
 
For good measure, the Panel went on to note in addition that ‘there is no hint 
that a tax advantage would not constitute an export subsidy simply because it 
reduced the exporter’s tax burden to a level comparable to that of foreign 
competitors’.56 This was so, even though such questions would matter 
tremendously if one were to assess the competitive effects of the subsidy from an 
orthodox economic perspective, with a view to correcting market distortions or 
levelling the competitive playing field. Again, it seems that the legal notion of a 
subsidy self-consciously and explicitly is distinguished from its economic 
counterpart, with barely any need for explanation. 
 
Brazil subsequently amended its measure, so that the interest rate payments in 
question were tied to a market benchmark related to the prevailing US Treasury 
Bond 10 year rate, plus an additional spread of 20 basis points. The problem 
here was whether this rate represented a reasonable approximation of what a 
commercial actor in the market might ask. But again the need to assess 
complicated economic evidence on this question was avoided through the use of 
a fictional benchmark referred to in the text of the agreement. Given the express 
reference in item (k) of the Illustrative List to ‘international undertaking[s] on 
official export credits’, the Panel (following an earlier Appellate Body ruling57) 
determined that one appropriate benchmark would be the relevant OECD 
Commercial Interest Reference Rate, as calculated according to the methodology 
set out in Article 16 of the OECD Arrangement.58 Aware that this reference rate 
may or may not correspond to a ‘true’ market rate, the Panel made it clear that it 
was open in principle for Brazil to prove that lower rates were actually 
commercially available on the market – even if in practice the prevalence of 
government involvement in this sector made finding appropriate commercial 
comparators almost impossible.59  
 
The same self-conscious adoption of a fictional or partial benchmark can be seen 
in some of the Panel decisions in the Softwood Lumber litigation. One issue which 
                                                        
55 Brazil-Aircraft (Panel), paras 7.24-25. 
56 Brazil-Aircraft (Panel), para 7.25. 
57 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (‘Brazil-Aircraft (AB)’), 
(adopted 20 Aug 1999), WT/DS46/AB/R, para 182. 
58 Panel Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft Recourse to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU by Canada (‘Brazil-Aircraft (21.5, Panel)’), (adopted, 4 Aug 2000), WT/DS46/RW, para 6.84 
and surrounding. 
59 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft Recourse to Article 
21.5 of the DSU by Canada (‘Brazil-Aircraft (21.5, AB)’), (adopted, 4 Aug 2000), WT/DS46/AB/RW, 
para 64. 
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famously arose in that litigation was whether the domestic Canadian market for 
stumpage provided an appropriate benchmark, given the thorough degree to 
which it was structured and affected by government action. In US – Softwood 
Lumber III, the Panel explicitly eschewed the economist’s preferred benchmark 
of a ‘hypothetical undistorted or perfectly competitive market’.60 Without 
contesting the substantive claim that the domestic market was in some sense 
fundamentally distorted, the Panel noted that ‘if the drafters of the SCM 
Agreement had wanted to exclude the use of market prices in case of price 
suppression due to the government’s involvement, they would have explicitly 
provided so, but they have not’.61 A subsequent Panel noted, significantly, that 
‘we do not believe that it would be appropriate for this Panel to substitute its 
economic judgment for that of the drafters’.62 It is true that this approach was 
subsequently revised by the Appellate Body, which found textual support for the 
rejection of such a distorted benchmark in certain circumstances. But the 
Appellate Body still drew a clear line between the legal benchmark defined in the 
text of the agreement, and the sort of perfect market benchmark used in 
economic analysis.63  
 
In all of these cited instances, then, the benchmarks used represented explicitly 
‘distorted’ markets, or fictions which bore no necessary connection to any 
known market, as their basis to define, characterise, or determine the effects of, 
the measures in dispute. The ‘market’ is being used pragmatically in these 
instances as a ‘tool to think with’ rather as a representation of the world, and its 
contours are self-consciously defined by reference to the function that it is 
supposed to serve. This, then, is the pragmatist side the new legal realism. It uses, 
in crucial aspects, precisely the opposite of the mode of argumentation described 
above, in which law acts as a vehicle for economic concepts and techniques. Here, 
the incorporation of a concept such as the ‘market’ into law fundamentally 
changes its character: the act of encoding it in law is precisely what allows the 
adjudicators in the above disputes to depart from purely economic 
understandings of the concept, and to construct their own fictional markets 
which purport to have validity, utility and relevance only within the legal context 
in which they arise, and which derive their authority precisely from that utility. 
This is the second half of the double movement: the re-assertion of the law’s 
formal autonomy from economic science, and the performance of its objectivity 
precisely through its indifference to the economic ‘facts’ of the situation. In the 
first move, the ‘facts’ are brought to bear on the law, and the law justifies itself by 
reference to them. In the second, the law willfully blinds itself to the facts of the 
social world, and justifies itself by reference to its blindness.  
 
                                                        
60 Panel Report, United States – Preliminary Determinations with respect to Certain Softwood 
Lumber from Canada (adopted 1 Nov 2002), WT/DS236/R, para 7.50. 
61 Ibid., para 7.52. 
62 Panel Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with respect to Certain 
Softwood Lumber from Canada (adopted 17 Feb 2004), WT/DS257/R, para 7.59.  
63 Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with respect to 
Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada (‘US – Lumber IV (AB)’) (adopted 17 Feb 2004), 
WT/DS257/AB/R, paras 100-101. 
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It is worth concluding this section by briefly anticipating one possible response. 
Is what I am describing really a tension within the jurisprudence, or does it just 
reflect an understanding on the part of the interpreters that empirical methods 
are useful only to a point, and that they are necessarily employed within a 
framework of concepts (here, the law) which is not itself able to be produced by 
such methods? Along these lines, one perfectly serviceable explanation of this 
jurisprudence under the Subsidies Agreement may simply be that its two side 
reflect nothing more than the different questions which Panels and the Appellate 
Body have been required to answer in the cases before them. There are certain 
questions – such as the product scope of the relevant market in Canada – FIT – 
which economic concepts and techniques can and do answer well. But there are 
certain other questions – such as the appropriate institutional foundations of the 
market used for benchmarking purposes – to which economics is just poorly 
suited, and therefore cannot be used. 
 
This sort of account certainly accounts for much, but at the same time it also 
misses something important. To suggest that the differing uses of economic 
expertise in dispute settlement proceedings derives simply from the nature of 
the question at issue is to miss the fact that the framing of the ‘question at issue’ 
is itself not entirely given but rather emerges as part of the argumentative 
process. It is the result of choices made by Panels and the Appellate Body, not 
(just) a cause of them. It is, to put the point more bluntly, one way of dealing with 
the underlying tension that I am talking about: ‘empirical methods should be 
used, but only as far as they are useful to the questions which arise within a 
controlling framework of legal concepts’. It is certainly very common in both 
scholarship and governance to reconcile the tension between empiricism and 
pragmatism in this way. But it is the tension itself, not any particular way of 
dealing with it, that I am suggesting is at the core of both this mode of 
governance, and for that matter new legal realist scholarship.  
 
 
IV. Scientific evidence in SPS disputes 
 
Like the SCM Agreement, the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) was the product of the Uruguay Round 
of negotiations, and entered into force in 1995. At the time, it was considered by 
all accounts a relatively minor and highly technical agreement, addressing only a 
very specific set of issues raised by a relatively minor set of trade restrictive 
measures, namely sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures. SPS measures are, 
speaking broadly, those food safety and quarantine measures which WTO 
Members use to protect their territories from pests and diseases and other 
health risks which enter through importation of foreign goods.  
 
For the purposes of the present argument, the most important provisions of the 
agreement are those which require SPS measures to have a scientific basis. 
Article 2.2 provides that: 
 
Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied 
only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, is 
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based on scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient scientific 
evidence, except as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 5. 
 
Article 5.1 elaborates further that Members ‘must ensure that their sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures are based on an assessment, as appropriate to the 
circumstances, of the risks to human, animal or plant life or health’ posed by the 
imports in question, with the following two paragraphs detailing the sorts of 
factors which ought to be taken into account in risk assessment. Article 5.7 
provides for a limited and temporary carveout where relevant scientific evidence 
is ‘insufficient’ to perform an adequate risk assessment. 
 
The relevance of these provisions for the present argument is clear: at least on 
the face of the text, there is an obvious sense in which the SPS Agreement 
provides pride of place to scientific expertise, using it as the primary measure by 
which to distinguish protectionist from legitimate SPS measures. In a move 
which for Jasanoff represents a globalisation of a particularly American culture 
of objectivity,64 it appears to draw on the epistemic authority of science for an 
objective, external standpoint from which to resolve SPS disputes. As such, it has 
been described as the ‘most ambitious technocratic achievement of the Uruguay 
Round’,65 and represents a good example of the close integration of law and 
science in international economic governance.  
 
But this is by no means the complete picture. In a perceptive analysis of the 2006 
Panel decision in EC–Biotech – a challenge brought by the United States, 
Argentina and Canada to the EU’s system for the approval of genetically modified 
crops and food – Bonneuil and Levidow describe what they call the ‘paradox’ of 
the jurisprudence under the SPS Agreement. On one hand, they note, the Biotech 
case was all about the nature and extent of scientific evidence of risks associated 
with GM products. More than 1000 pages of text – including submissions from 
parties, and the report itself with its annexes – was dedicated, they observe, to 
summarising and discussing the scientific evidence and expert opinions put 
forward by both parties. On the other, however: 
 
the Panel hardly refers to scientific arguments in its findings, which instead 
emphasize the defendant’s procedural failures, and the Panel’s conclusions are 
strictly fashioned as a legal interpretation. Moreover, the Panel avoids any 
substantive judgement on whether or not the defendant’s procedures were 
based on scientific evidence of risk.66 
 
Thus, the Panel found against one aspect of the EU’s approval system on the 
basis that it led to an undue delay in decision-making procedures. It found 
further that EC Member State measures were non-compliant with Article 5.1 on 
the basis that the documents on which they were based did not meet the formal 
requirements of a ‘risk assessment’ as defined in Annex 1. And it found that 
Article 5.7 was inapplicable simply by referring to the fact that the EU itself had 
                                                        
64 Jasanoff, ‘The Practices of Objectivity in Regulatory Science’ in Camic, Gross and Lamont, Social 
Knowledge in the Making (U Chicago Press, 2011), 307-336. 
65 Bonneuil and Levidow, “How does the World Trade Organization know? The mobilization and 
staging of scientific expertise in the GMO trade dispute,” (2012) 42(1) Social Studies of Science 79. 
66 Bonneuil and Levidow, ‘How does the World Trade Organization know?’, 77. 
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carried out its own risk assessment to show that existing evidence was sufficient 
to perform a risk assessment. All of these grounds for decisions, Bonneuil and 
Levidow note, permitted the Panel to avoid taking a positions on questions of 
disputed scientific knowledge, even as the legitimacy of the judgement rested in 
some real sense on its ‘’science-based’ imprimateur’.67 
 
This paradox represents an illustration of the double movement which in my 
view characterises the jurisprudence under the science provisions of the SPS 
Agreement as a whole. On one side, there are many occasions in the 
jurisprudence in which the line between scientific and legal judgments becomes 
blurred. The views of scientific experts on matters of risk are taken to be more or 
less determinative of the legal question of whether there is a violation of the 
relevant SPS provision. The legal burden of proof is not clearly distinguished 
from the scientific burden of substantive persuasion, and legal objectivity is 
effectively equated with scientific rigour and adherence to scientific standards of 
truth. On the other side, however, and sometimes even in the same cases, Panels 
and the Appellate Body are at pains to draw a clear line between legal and 
scientific issues, to emphasise that legal standards of sufficiency of scientific 
evidence are different from those pertaining in scientific communities, to note 
that a finding of a violation of the SPS Agreement is not the same thing as a 
determination about the nature and extent of risk, and to draw a clear distinction 
between the role of the adjudicator and that of the scientific expert. This second 
aspect is pragmatist in the sense that it is oriented towards the production of 
legal not scientific ‘facts’, and legal facts are precisely those which are produced – 
precisely as pragmatist philosophy would imagine – for a purpose, in action, and 
intimately tied to the institutional context of decision-making. 
 
One of the best illustrations of this dynamic comes from the twists and turns of 
the jurisprudence on the standard of review applicable under Articles 2.2 and 5.1. 
of the SPS Agreement.68 The first case to deal with this question was EC – 
Hormones, in which the Appellate Body hedged its bets somewhat. On one hand, 
the Appellate Body noted, the standard of review is not ‘de novo review as such’, 
which would place the Panel in the same position as the risk assessor, requiring 
it to form its own view as to the substantive merits of scientific dispute brought 
before it. On the other hand, however, nor was the appropriate standard that of 
‘total deference’, which would of course undermine the operation and objectives 
of the Agreement as a whole. The appropriate standard, it opined, was found in 
Article 11 of the DSU, namely, an ‘objective assessment of the facts’. In practice, 
this turned out in that case to be a relatively deferential standard. Thus, the 
Appellate Body famously made clear in its decision that WTO Members have the 
right to rely on minority scientific opinion without having that decision called 
into question in a WTO tribunal. What matters, the Appellate Body said, was 
merely that this minority opinion came from a ‘qualified and respected source’, 
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and that it reasonably supported the SPS measure in question.69 Thus the 
technique of defining the standard of review was deployed to shift the terms of 
argument, from the scientific question of whether the evidence was persuasive 
or correct, to the legal question of whether it was sufficient for the purposes of 
the SPS Agreement, taking into account the institutional issue of ‘the balance 
established in [the SPS Agreement] between the jurisdictional competences 
conceded by the Members to the WTO and the jurisdictional competences 
retained by the Members for themselves.’70. 
 
In a number of subsequent cases, however, legal and scientific judgments were 
not so clearly distinguished. Perhaps the best example is Japan – Apples, in which 
a core question was whether the importation of apples (especially mature, 
symptomless apples) was likely to lead to the introduction of fire blight into the 
Japanese ecosystem. The Panel found that it was not, primarily on the basis of 
the opinion of the independent experts called to give evidence before it: 
 
we note, in light of the elements placed before us by the parties, as well as in 
light of the comments of the experts appointed by the Panel, that the scientific 
evidence suggests a negligible risk of possible transmission of fire blight through 
apple fruit ..  
 
We further recall the opinion of the experts that due to the development of new 
scientific research tools, in particular DNA-based methods, they were more 
confident than ever before that there was only a negligible chance of fire blight 
being transmitted through apple fruit …  
 
Nonetheless, we note that even if the scientific evidence before us demonstrates 
that apple fruit is highly unlikely to be a pathway for the entry, establishment 
and spread of fire blight within Japan, it does suggest that some slight risk of 
contamination cannot be totally excluded. The experts all categorized this risk as 
"negligible" … 71 
 
Importantly, the Panel appeared to think that it followed immediately from this 
conclusion that the measure was ‘maintained without sufficient scientific 
evidence’ for the purposes of Article 2.1. For a number of commentators, this 
decision came close to the de novo review prohibited by the Appellate Body in 
EC-Hormones.72 Whether or not that is true, at the very least we can say that the 
foundation of the decision was in the scientific determination of facts, and that in 
practice the Panel’s finding of a legal violation flowed almost automatically from 
the scientific opinions given before it. 
 
In US/Canada – Continued Suspension, both sides of the double movement were 
clearly visible. Here, it played out as a disagreement over the appropriate 
standard of review between the Panel and the Appellate Body. The Panel, in a 
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famous statement, set out a standard of review which on its face appears to place 
the legal adjudicator in a similar position to that of the scientific assessor: 
  
Although the Panel is not carrying out its own risk assessment, its situation is 
similar in that it may benefit from hearing the full spectrum of experts' views 
and thus obtain a more complete picture both of the mainstream scientific 
opinion and of any divergent views … [On some points], a larger number of 
experts expressed opinions and, sometimes, they expressed diverging opinions. 
While, on some occasions, we followed the majority of experts expressing 
concurrent views, in some others the divergence of views were such that we 
could not follow that approach and decided to accept the position(s) which 
appeared, in our view, to be the most specific in relation to the question at issue 
and to be best supported by arguments and evidence. As we have told the 
parties and the experts during these proceedings, this Panel is not composed of 
scientists.73  
 
In context, the claim that the ‘Panel is not composed of scientists’ at the end of 
the quotation should be understood not as a way of drawing a boundary 
between legal and scientific expertise, but rather as articulating an attitude of 
deference to scientific expertise on crucial determinations of fact. The Panel’s 
statement, it seems to me, sets out a standard and process of review which to a 
very large extent locates the task of determining the legality of the measure in 
the determination of facts, in turn based heavily on opinions of scientific experts. 
 
The Appellate Body in the same case, however, took a very different view.  
 
It is the WTO Member's task to perform the risk assessment. The panel's task is 
to review that risk assessment. Where a panel goes beyond this limited mandate 
and acts as a risk assessor, it would be substituting its own scientific judgement 
for that of the risk assessor and making a de novo review and, consequently, 
would exceed its functions under Article 11 of the DSU. Therefore, the review 
power of a panel is not to determine whether the risk assessment undertaken by 
a WTO Member is correct, but rather to determine whether that risk assessment 
is supported by coherent reasoning and respectable scientific evidence and is, in 
this sense, objectively justifiable.74 
 
It reiterated its finding in the earlier Hormones case that WTO Members are 
permitted to base their measures on divergent or minority opinion, as long as 
this minority opinion has ‘the necessary scientific and methodological rigour to 
be considered reputable science’.75 Once this criterion is met, the Appellate Body 
said, a Panel’s task is to ‘assess whether the reasoning articulated on the basis of 
the scientific evidence is objective and coherent’.76 While the precise meaning of 
this text has proved to be nebulous, what is crystal clear is the function that the 
Appellate Body’s test is playing here. It is a way of drawing a clear line between 
legal and scientific processes of review, such that the preponderance of scientific 
evidence on any particular point of fact becomes less significant to the resolution 
of the legal questions at hand, and the application of independent legal expertise 
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more significant. In a move reminiscent of Bonneuil and Levidow’s analysis of 
the Biotech Panel’s judicial avoidance techniques, the Appellate Body in 
Continued Suspension found ultimately that in light of the Panel’s 
misunderstanding of the appropriate standard of review, and in light of the 
inadequacy of the relevant evidence before it, it was not able to make a decision 
on the legality of the European measure before it. 
 
The pendulum appears to have swung again in the relatively recent SPS case of 
Australia – Apples. Here, the Appellate Body reiterated its statement of the 
appropriate standard of review from Continued Suspension, but this time gave 
heavy emphasis to the final stage of the articulated review process, namely the 
question ‘whether the reasoning articulated on the basis of the scientific 
evidence is objective and coherent’. At this stage of the analysis, the Appellate 
Body joined the Panel in conducting what looked very similar in substance to the 
sort of review conducted years earlier by the Panel in Japan – Apples. Virtually 
every assumption in every model used by the risk assessor was tested for its 
veracity and realism, and intermediate conclusions inferred from indirect 
evidence were tested for their logic, such that one is left with the overwhelming 
impression that the basis of the decision was simply that neither the Panel nor 
the Appellate Body found Australia’s risk assessment substantively persuasive.77  
 
 
V. Conclusion: relative objectivity 
 
I began by suggesting that the old legal realists were somewhat more ambivalent 
in their theory of knowledge than is commonly noted. This reflects their 
attempts to marry empiricism and pragmatism, with their very different 
underlying theories of knowledge. I also suggested – following Tomlins – that 
their project to integrate law and the social sciences was also more ambivalent 
than it first appears. It was both an attempt to borrow the new authority of the 
social sciences, and a bid to re-assert law’s independent authority over and 
above them. The modes of technocratic governance produced by this project 
therefore brought together legal and scientific expertises somewhat 
schizophrenically, simultaneously erasing and re-affirming the boundaries 
between the two, offering techniques of decision-making which pushed in two 
opposing directions at once. 
 
But it turns out that this ambivalence has been the source and foundation of the 
law’s pragmatic resilience in the face of late 20th century critiques of scientific 
objectivity. The legal realists lost faith in formalism as the foundation of the law’s 
objectivity, and sought to recreate the law on the foundation of scientific 
empiricism. In doing so, they created a mode of governance which sat 
somewhere uneasily between the two, alternating between quasi-formalism and 
quasi-empiricism as its self-justifying discourse. One might imagine that this 
combination would inevitably fail once both of its apparently objective 
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foundations had been radically undermined, one after the other. In fact, however, 
the mixture has proved to be resilient, and to be able to satisfy, at least at an 
everyday, pragmatic level, the practical demand for reasonably objective 
decision-making in particular governance contexts. It has still maintained a 
capacity to ground law in ‘facts’, at least where scientific knowledge is 
provisionally settled. And where science is politicized and destabilized, it offers 
the possibility of performing objectivity as formal legal process – no longer 
understood as application of determinate rules, but rather as a mode of decision-
making which is credibly distant from (impartial in respect of) scientific 
controversy. I do not mean this to be celebratory in tone – the point I am making 
is one about how this mode of governance works, and how it achieves its 
resilience, not about its desirability. 
 
The trick, then, is that formalism and empiricism each have ‘relative objectivity’ - 
objectivity, that is to say, in relation to the other. Each provides a set of 
techniques for credibly distancing oneself from the controversies which beset 
the other, so that the artful combination of the two can achieve what neither can 
do on its own. And of course its operation is predicated upon a redefinition of 
what objectivity and objective decision-making is: no longer is there any 
aspiration in this sort of governance to the transcendent, which both the legal 
realists and the classical formalists appeared at times to desire. In its place, we 
have the more modest aim of produce choices which can credibly pass as 
objective in a particular context, for certain purposes, and only for now. In the 
end, perhaps, that may be one of the most enduring legacies of the ‘old’ legal 
realists for those today who work in the new legal realist vein.  
 
